Analysis: In a PIIGS crisis, which way will investors fly?
The biggest single lesson of the 2008 global financial crisis was that when debt goes bad the knock-on effects are hard to predict. The market for low-quality US mortgage paper was small, but enough players had geared into it that its collapse hit financial institutions from New York to Frankfurt to Tokyo.So, while the big Australian banks hold no significant debt in the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain), it's still worth asking how Australia and New Zealand would fare in a PIIGS-triggered financial crisis.And the two most likely scenarios are very different from each other.The first scenario is a virtual replay of the 2008 global financial crisis, with overseas debt funding drying up for a period of time. Industry figures such as NAB's CEO, Cameron Clyne, have raised concerns recently about Australia's dependency on overseas funding in such a situation. And, in New Zealand, RBNZ Governor Alan Bollard last year revealed his late-2008 concerns that "should the financial markets remain frozen, the New Zealand banks had only about three months' secure international funding." But, as RBA deputy governor Ric Battelino pointed out last week, it's not clear that another jamming-up of global markets similar to the 2008 episode would hurt Australian (or NZ) banks even as much as 2008 did. In the 2008 crisis, Australia discovered several adjustment mechanisms, apart from slower credit growth. Notably, domestic consumption fell and savings rose, while overseas borrowers helped fund a temporary rise in government spending.Australasian banks have also strengthened their position since 2008. Not only have they built up capital, but they have lengthened debt maturities. The short-term debt of Australian banks, which was above 30 per cent of funding in 2008, is now barely 20 per cent.Looking at the other side of banks' balance sheets, as the table shows, the claims of Australian banks on customers in Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece are trivial or virtually non-existent. At around US$5 billion in aggregate they represent less than one per cent of their offshore claims.But the most important change since 2008 could be the shift in attitudes to the Australian economy. In an era of high developed-country sovereign debt, Australia had low-debt governments. In an era of weak developed-country growth and high unemployment, it has solid growth and low unemployment. The current cover of The Economist magazine - at least its Asia-Pacific incarnation - declares Australia "The next Golden State".The second scenario pictured for Australia, and perhaps New Zealand, is a Greek-triggered financial crisis that sees this part of the world becoming an unlikely safe haven. In this scenario, the Australasian banks could actually find it easier to attract overseas funds.The Grattan Institute's Saul Eslake, a former ANZ chief economist who understands banking well, argues this possibility should not be discounted. Australasian banks pay some of the highest interest rates on short-term borrowings. If European banks have to absorb the pain of a Greek default, their lenders may look elsewhere. For decades, US Treasuries have been the safe haven of