The standard story of modern financial history - that Australian banks were well run and well supervised - takes a few knocks from the account of Alan Bollard, governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, in his book on the global financial crisis, 'Crisis'.From a largely complaining attitude about increased regulation, New Zealand banks owned by Australian parents over the crisis period in late 2008 and early 2009 turned to being very co-operative with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Both banks and their regulator sought to deal with their primary concern over what to do if international debt markets remained closed.Alan Bollard details this change of relationship in his book.The book focuses mainly on one key worry of Bollard: that all the major New Zealand banks were at risk because of their increased reliance on overseas funding, mainly in the short-term market."We had not envisaged a scenario so bad that all the banks could be at risk," he writes.In the initial stages of the crisis, when the government introduced the retail deposit guarantee scheme, the big four banks made vigorous protests because they were being singled out to pay the fees.  Bollard explains the RBNZ's own reasoning - the banks have historically run their business on short-term overseas funds, which was now a vulnerable way of operating, and they were now feeling the pain.But as the crisis deepened, the relationship changed and got closer, with the proximity coming mainly from the banks' side. Their aim was to convey what was happening in the market because their lingering worry was about how their peers fared."The key message from each was that their own bank was surviving but we should worry about the others," Bollard writes.Bollard describes how he worried about the inexperience of the CEOs of the four main banks. Most of them were new, and most were Australians, largely untested in their roles, and with little acquaintance with the New Zealand market.In particular, there was a worry that there could be tension between the New Zealand subsidiaries and their parents in a worsening situation.Through the book Bollard details the various steps he had to take as the financial crisis got bigger, with some announcements made without a clue on what the action was actually going to be. However, very modestly, he states that it was mainly due to luck that New Zealand survived without any bank collapses, no big government bailouts and no nasty scars."But we have no cause to be smug; it was not by our cleverness that we survived," he reminds his readers.Bollard makes some interesting revelations in the book about how the RBNZ carefully chose its words for its November 2008 Financial Stability Report."We knew that should the financial markets remain frozen, the New Zealand banks had only about three months' secure international funding at current lending rates. But we could not mention that."In another instance, Bollard recalls how he dreaded the thought of having to convey a grim message through another FSR."Reserve Bank fears