Whilst the challenge of raising capital and delivering more for products is real, “we are confident” purrs Xinja chair Lindley Edwards.
“We are poised to grow Xinja and to continue on the path to profitability as we generate revenue, “Edwards writes in her foreword to the 2020 annual report for Xinja Bank Limited.
“We had no money to spend on marketing, building our brand or extensive product launches,” … add that to the list of things Xinja CEO Eric Wilson really did say.
“COVID-19 is really bad for banking competition.” Wilson also said that.
“The regulatory costs on Xinja are significant and material … these costs are fixed or growing, and consume an ever-larger percentage of available funds.”
Wilson also tried to beat the good news drum.
The Stash account: “we expect to have it open again soon” (although that is dependent on mid-East capital that’s not turning up).
Needing A$65 million to stay in business let alone grow, that’s the truth of the Xinja Bank neobank fiasco in Australia.
The most unprofitable bank will be the most unstable bank and the Australian financial oligarchy are not above a full-scale shutdown of Xinja Bank; should have happened months ago.
The FY2020 loss was $35.9 million, and 2019, start-up year, burned off $21.9 billion.
Take away $64.2 million in retained losses from $89.2 million in share capital and less than a third is left.
Management had to restate expenses and last year’s loss to the tune of $718,000.
The going concern basis for the 2020 Xinja Bank financial statements are tenuous. Raising capital from Dubai? Maybe or not likely, not at all really.
Worst of all Xinja lacks basic banking capability and seems in no rush to update its offer.
Should it ever have even opened for business?